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Two countries; combined crime-fighting ability might be greater than the sum of their 
individual capacities where their capabilities complement each other. This article inves-
tigates transnational coordination against environmental crime. Australian utilization 
of mutual legal assistance and anti-money laundering mechanisms to prosecute offences 
related to illegal logging in Indonesia are examined as a case study. In theory, inter-
rupting the transfer of proceeds of environmental crime across national borders en-
hances transnational law enforcement. The case study demonstrates that difficult legal 
obstacles can obstruct practical cooperation between neighbouring countries combat-
ing transnational environmental crime in the timber sector. Therefore, international 




The connections between transnational crime and environmental crime are present in 
illegal logging. This article surveys Australian and Indonesian laws against illegal log-
ging and against dealing in the proceeds of crime, with a view to analysing whether 
those countries’ laws can work together. It commences by placing Indonesian-
Australian illegal timber trade within the context of transnational environmental crime 
and compares the criminalization of illegal logging and of dealing in the proceeds of 
crime within each jurisdiction. It then undertakes a case study that follows the proceeds 
from Indonesian illegal logging in Australian law with a view to their confiscation. It 
focuses on ‘dual criminality’ and finds that Australian laws can be used to seize pro-
ceeds from illegal logging in Indonesia. However, prosecutions for illegal logging and 
related crimes, such as money laundering, require a commitment of law enforcement 
resources and concomitant international cooperation. The practical hurdles in securing 
evidence may be insuperable. Nevertheless, the return on cooperative labours will be 
greater than the sum of each country’s lone actions. 
 
TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME 
 
An environmental crime can be defined as an action in breach of a national environmen-
tal law where that breach is subject to prosecution and, on conviction, the imposition of 
criminal penalties.
1
 The term ‘transnational environmental crime’ simply refers to envi-




The nature of the cross-border elements can vary widely, from physical acts such as 
simple poaching and smuggling by a lone operator, to intangible acts such as conspiring 
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in complex layered transactions across multiple jurisdictions by organized criminal syn-
dicates.
3
 The latter might include bribery and corruption to support the domestic com-
mission of the offence,
4
 whilst money laundering disguises the illicit origin of proceeds 




For example, ‘ramin’, a valuable once plentiful species of light hardwood that has been 
depleted in Indonesia, is subject to a national ban on logging and commercial trade. It is 
logged illegally in protected areas, such as the Tanjung Puting National Park in Indone-
sian Borneo. Neighbouring Malaysia is a transit destination for illegally sourced Indo-
nesian ramin to be issued with fraudulent certificates of origin.
6
 After transport to pro-
cessing centres such as China, India and Vietnam and conversion into timber products,
7
 
it is exported via other countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore or Taiwan for market-
ing to consumers in Europe, North America, China or Japan.
8
 It has been alleged that 
some of the world’s largest flooring companies acquire cheap timber at auction on the 
‘spot market’ indifferent to its illegal origin.
9
 These timber harvesting and transporta-
tion structures, and the movement of proceeds back to Indonesia, evidence the compli-




Illegal logging stands out as one of the world’s most profitable forms of environmental 
crime. It is estimated that approximately 10% of global timber is produced illegally. In 
2015, the global timber market was estimated at US$250 billion of which US$25 billion 
was attributable to illegal sourcing.
11
 Illicit timber production at such volumes drives 
down the commodity price and harms the licit industry by over-saturating the timber 
market.
12
 It can also cause declines in public revenue, biodiversity, soil, water quality, 
                                                          
3
 M. Levi, ‘Breaking the Economic Power of Organised Crime Groups’, in: D. Siegel, H. van de Bunt and 
D. Zaitch (eds.), Global Organized Crime (Springer, 2003), 117. 
4
 Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) and Telapak Indonesia, ‘The Thousand Headed Snake: For-
est Crimes, Corruption and Injustice in Indonesia’ (2007), at 1; WWF – United Kingdom, ‘Fighting For-
est Crime and the Illegal Timber Trade’ (2004). 
5
 B. Setiono, ‘Fighting Illegal Logging and Forest related Financial Crime: The Anti-Money Laundering 
Approach’ (Presentation at the Workshop on Transnational Environmental Crime and Illegal Resource 
Activity in the Asia Pacific, the Australian National University, Canberra, 22-23 March 2007). Specific 
advocacy for the use of anti-money laundering (AML) regimes to combat illegal logging in Indonesia was 
led by BamBang Setiono, an economist with the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) lo-
cated in Bogor, Indonesia. 
6
 EIA and Telapak Indonesia, ‘Timber Trafficking: Illegal Logging in Indonesia, South East Asia and 
International Consumption of Illegally Sourced Timber’ (2001), at 17 and 23-25. 
7
 EIA and Telapak Indonesia, ‘The Last Frontier: Illegal Logging in Papua and China’s Massive Timber 
Theft’ (2005), at 10 and 22; EIA and Telapak Indonesia, ‘Vietnam: How the Country Has Become a Hub 
for the Region's Illegal Timber Trade’ (2008). 
8
 A. Hoare, ‘Tackling Illegal Logging and the Related Trade: What Progress and Where Next?’(Chatham 
House, 2015), at 25. 
9
 Documentation for this timber is rarely provided by auctioneers indifferent to its provenance. EIA and 
Telapak Indonesia, ‘Behind the Veneer: How Indonesia’s Last Rainforests Are Being Felled for Flooring’ 
(2006). 
10
 G. Bruinsma and W. Barnasco, ‘Criminal Groups and Transnational Illegal Markets’, 41:1 Crime, Law 
& Social Change (2004), 79, at 80. 
11
 See A. Hoare, n. 8 above. 
12
 D. Brack, K. Gray and G. Hayman, ‘Controlling the International Trade in Illegally Logged Timber and 
Wood Products’ (Chatham House, 2002), at 9 and 12. 
 
climate management and the rule of law.
13
 The timber illegally produced in Indonesia in 




Illegal logging is most commonly associated with developing equatorial States, but it 
occurs in all types of forests throughout South-East Asia, Central Africa, Eastern Eu-
rope, Russia, South America and North America.
15
 About 50% of the world’s illegal 
timber (i.e., 40 million m³) in 2013 came from Indonesia.
16
 Half of all illegally pro-





INDONESIAN-AUSTRALIAN ILLEGAL TIMBER NEXUS 
 
By 2004, over one-third of Indonesian forest had been devastated by illegal logging, 43 
million from an original 120 million hectares.
18
 Estimates of the percentage of illegal 
logging are high, 40% of total timber production as at 2013, down from a peak at over 
80% illegal production in 2000.
19
 The decline reflects a shift away from major logging 
concessions in natural forests, to plantations for the production of timber (for pulp and 
paper) and for oil palm. Despite the decline in the percentage of illegal logging, the rate 
of deforestation overall is increasing due to illegal forest conversion for oil palm and 




Indonesia is Australia’s third most valuable supplier of regulated timber products and, 
during the period 2009-2013, Indonesian timber product exports to Australia annually 
averaged US$394.5 million.
21
 Tracing the legal origin of timber products is difficult, 
with only an estimated 8% being raw timber and the rest constituting furniture, paper, 
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plywood and other processed building products.
22
 It has been estimated that 9% of the 




The Australian Government has sought for several years to reduce the importation of 
illegal timber and related products, and to ensure that all forest products imported into 
Australia are sustainably sourced.
24
 Some timber importers adopted voluntary standards 
internal to the industry and 22% of importers relied on forest certification schemes to 
verify the legality of timber, such as the Australian Forestry Standard.
25
 Until recently, 
there was no national industry-wide standard to avoid the importation, use and sale of 
illegally sourced timber products.
26
 The Australian Parliament adopted a timber legality 
framework, the Illegal Logging Prohibition Act, to promote trade in legally logged tim-
ber in 2012. It imposes obligations on importers and processers to exercise due dili-




CRIMINALIZATION OF ILLEGAL LOGGING 
 
Illegal logging is a term commonly used but not formally defined. It is set out here as 
the sourcing, transport or conversion of timber in contravention of national laws includ-
ing sourcing of timber from: areas without permission or in breach of logging permit 
conditions; internationally or domestically recognized protected zones; protected spe-
cies; or in excess of authorized limits, as well as the conduct of such activities with 







There has been a decentralization of power in recent years in many areas of Indonesian 
governance of natural resources from national to local legislatures.
29
 The national legis-
lature retains superior authority and the following discussion considers the legislative 
regime at a national level. 
Indonesian logging was initially regulated in 1967 under national forestry laws in a 
piecemeal fashion. Following President Soeharto’s ‘New Order’ regime, the Habibie 
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Government passed a Law on Forestry
30
 to govern the industry comprehensively.
31
 The 
term ‘illegal logging’ (‘pembalakan liar’) is not defined in the Law on Forestry and its 
meaning must be understood from the specifically proscribed conduct, such as causing 
forest harm.
32
 The proscribed conduct constitutes serious offences under the Indonesian 
Penal Code (which divides unlawful conduct between serious and lesser offences), at-
tracting penalties of 5-10 years imprisonment and hefty fines.
33
 Investigations are con-
ducted by forestry officials
34
 and powers to arrest and detain are held by the police
35
 
who ultimately decide whether a criminal prosecution should be initiated.
36
 National 
Police investigation progress and the governance integrity in the Ministry of Forests 
remain weak. For example, in Riau, Sumatra, investigations into 13 of 14 companies 




Unfortunately, corruption is endemic at the local level in both the forestry and police 
services.
38
 In 2005, as part of a policy against corruption, then President Susilo Bam-
bang Yudhoyono instructed prosecutors to prosecute illegal logging in connection with 
corruption.
39
 A specialized team was established to boost the national effort and the 
Government enjoyed some success, disclosing that certain criminals engaged in illegal 
logging had connections with major companies. Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication 
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 Indonesia ranks amongst the most corrupt States in the world, although the situation is improving; e.g. 
where ‘1’ ranks as least corrupt, the country was ranked 88th in 2016, 107th in 2014, 142nd in 2007, and 
137th in 2005. See: Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perception Index’, found at: 
<http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007>. 
39
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Commission has made progress, with at least two successful major corruption prosecu-
tions,
40
 but the difficulties of securing evidence of corrupt behaviour remain frustrating. 
Timber crime reports have fallen, perhaps due to greater criminal sophistication.
41
 The 
most common convictions are of truck drivers carrying illegal logs. No evidentiary link 
tends to be found between the drivers and any information held in financial institutions 






Australian laws against illegal logging do not parallel those of Indonesia. Australia is a 
federation where the primary responsibility for forest management and law enforcement 
lies with sub-national state and territory governments.
43
 They are signatories to the Aus-
tralian National Forest Policy Statement, which promotes nationally coordinated forest 
policy, and has goals of developing an ‘economically viable and ecologically sustaina-
ble forest industry’,
44
 including the prevention of illegal logging. The states have con-
cluded Regional Forest Agreements with the Federal Government that provide frame-
works for their respective forest conservation efforts. Although the term ‘illegal log-
ging’ is not used or defined in these instruments, proscriptions of breaches of the rele-
vant legislation define pertinent crimes in each sub-national jurisdiction. 
 
A cursory survey of the legislation indicates that offences related to illegal logging are 
minor, attracting relatively modest penalties, rather than indictable (i.e., entailing a jail 
sentence of up to a year or more). For example, in New South Wales, the cutting or re-
moval of any timber from a state forest is an offence attracting a fine or six months im-
prisonment.
45
 In instances where the illegal logging occurs in a national park in New 
South Wales, it is prohibited to possess or sell a protected native plant attracting a fine 




Constitutional jurisdiction over imports and exports gave the federal government the 
power to legislate over the Australian trade in illegally harvested timber.
47
 It defines 
illegally logged as timber that has been ‘harvested in contravention of laws in force in 
the place (whether or not in Australia) where the timber was harvested’.
48
 Accordingly, 
the Illegal Logging Prohibition Act 2012 makes it an offence to intentionally, knowing-
ly or recklessly import or process illegally logged timber or timber products. This of-
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fence is indictable, and entails up to five years imprisonment.
49
 However, it does not 
criminalize the illegal logging itself but, rather, dealing in the proceeds of the crime. 
 
ILLEGAL TIMBER HANDLING AND LAUNDERING CRIMES 
 
Money laundering is essentially the hiding of goods or profits obtained by criminal 
means from the attention of law enforcement agencies and other criminals.
50
 It also in-
volves dealing in property which is the proceeds of crime.
51
 A three-part definition of 
money laundering derived from the Convention on Transnational Organised Crime is: 
(i) any act which is performed directly, or through a third party intermediary; (ii) which 
deals with funds, property or recognizable legal rights of any kind; (iii) when such act is 
designed to prevent the discovery of the origin of the property.
52
 An intergovernmental 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established by the Group of 7 in 1989 at the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It issued recom-
mendations in 1990 to combat money laundering. The 40 recommendations are imple-




In the context of money laundering, the original crime is called a predicate offence. Alt-
hough the operation of money laundering offences was traditionally confined to the 
proceeds of well-recognized crimes such as drug trafficking, the range of predicate of-
fences is broadening in accordance with FATF recommendations to include environ-
mental crimes.
54
 It would be difficult to continue to profit from the massive illegal ex-
ploitation of forestry resources without concealing the criminal origin of timber pro-
ceeds by utilising money laundering techniques. Illegal logging is, thus, inextricably 
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In 2002, the Indonesian Government introduced laws to criminalize money launder-
ing.
56
 The offences that could trigger prosecution for money laundering were speci-
fied.
57
 The new laws were considered by the FATF as being an inadequate implementa-
tion of the relevant items in its ‘40 recommendations’ to combat money laundering and 
it threatened to blacklist financial transactions with Indonesian financial institutions un-
less further and more comprehensive implementation was achieved.
58
 Consequently, an 
expanded range of offences was introduced through amendments in 2003.
59
 The predi-
cate offences now include forestry, environmental and maritime offences and any of-




An expanded range of AML duties was identified, which obliged financial institutions 
to be more prudent in ensuring compliance with the new system and to conduct a higher 
level of due diligence on their transactions.
61
 Large cash transactions and suspicious 
transactions are to be reported to the Indonesia Transactions Report and Analysis Centre 
(PPATK).
62
 Penalties for money laundering were also increased. They are 5-15 years 
imprisonment and a fine of 100 million-5 billion rupiah (US$10,000 to $1.5 million).
63
 
Instead of imprisonment, corporate contraventions may result in penalties such as disso-
lution, liquidation and the revocation of business licences.
64
 In addition to these sanc-
tions, the instruments used to commit the crimes and the criminal proceeds are both sub-
ject to forfeiture
65
 and there is provision for confiscation of the proceeds of crime upon 
conviction for a predicate offence. A civil procedure to seize property embezzled from 
the State is available to government agencies
66
 and introduction of a non-conviction de-
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The PPATK is the key Indonesian authority responsible for AML activity.
68
 In particu-
lar, it has the authority to identify, investigate, and request the confiscation of the pro-
ceeds of crime. However, as is usual for financial intelligence units, the PPATK does 
not have prosecutorial powers. The Indonesian National Police have sole authority to 
prepare a dossier and, if the financial crimes investigation unit is satisfied that conduct 
should be prosecuted, the police refer the matter to the Public Prosecutor’s Office or the 
Attorney-General who may authorise prosecution.
69
 The inability of PPATK to bring 
prosecutions in its own right can frustrate its AML activities as the Indonesian National 
Police do not have similar skills to PPATK analysts and remain subject to corruption. 
 
An Indonesian Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS)
70
 was introduced in 2012. It 
serves to suppress laundering of illegally harvested logs by requiring that exporters of 
Indonesian timber products obtain a Timber Legality Certificate (‘SVLK’) for harvested 
timber and a V-Legal verification document for each shipment. In 2013, Indonesia be-
came the first Asian country to sign a Voluntary Partnership Agreement under the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) Timber Regulation concerning the legality of harvested timber ex-
ported to the European Union common market.
71
 It then was the first country in the 
world, on 15 November 2016, to be authorized to issue licences under this EU Regula-
tion. The EU Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) licences are 
issued subject to a Timber Legality Certificate under the TLAS. Importers into the EU 
of timber products covered by a FLEGT licence are exempted from undertaking their 
own independent due diligence checks on the legality of the source of timber. The li-





Criminal proceeds in Australia were estimated in 2004 to be worth AU$4.5 billion a 
year.
72
 The Australian Criminal Code proscribes money laundering
73
 and the Anti-





 (AUSTRAC Act) and the Proceeds of Crime Act
76
 also play 
key roles in an administrative regime to identify transactions involving the proceeds of 
crime (or financing of terrorism) and to institute a mechanism for the confiscation of 
any such proceeds. 
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The Illegal Logging Prohibition Act 2012 makes it an indictable offence to import ille-
gally logged timber,
77
 to import it in regulated timber products,
78
 or to process illegally 
logged raw logs.
79
 Thus, it criminalizes certain forms of handling (importation or pro-
cessing) of the proceeds of a specified crime (illegal logging).
80
 The criminal intent is 
premised on a culprit’s failure to meet the statutory duty of due diligence. The Act’s 
regulations specify due diligence requirements as: (i) information gathering;
81
 (ii) 
checking the reliability of the information by using a timber legality framework or 
country-specific guideline;
 
(iii) risk assessment by considering whether other infor-
mation might indicate illegality; and, if so, then (iv) risk mitigation.
82
 The use of a rec-
ognized timber legality assurance framework refers to a standard in international use 
such as that of the EU,
83
 whereas compliance with a country-specific guideline refers to 
a recognized national system such as the Indonesian TLAS.
84
 If no timber legality 
framework or national guideline is in place, it becomes necessary to conduct an inde-
pendent risk assessment (step iii above), taking into account the prevalence of illegal 
logging in the harvesting area, illegal harvesting of the specific species, and the pres-
ence of armed conflict as risk factors, as well as the complexity of the product and any 
other available information.
85
 The risk mitigation process (which requires making a 
written record of the process of consideration) must be proportionate to the identified 
risk and may include a decision not to import a timber product.
86
 A fine applies for a 
failure to undertake any step of the due diligence requirements. 
 
The Criminal Code (Division 400) criminalizes general dealings with, including import-
ing, the proceeds of crime.
87
 Property is defined in broad enough terms to include tim-
ber.
88
 Conduct is criminalized when a person deals in money or property that is the pro-
ceeds of crime.
89
 The dealings are criminalized whether a person acted with deliberate 
intent, recklessness or negligence in relation to the fact that the property is proceeds of 
crime, although the applicable penalties diminish as the person’s conscious deliberation 
attenuates.
90
 In addition, the possession of property reasonably suspected of being pro-
ceeds of crime is criminalized.
91
 It is not necessary to prove that the particular predicate 
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offence was committed or that a particular person committed the offence, but merely the 
fact that the property dealt with was proceeds of crime.
92
 That threshold fact would need 
to be proved to the common law criminal standard, i.e. beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
geographical scope of application of Division 400 includes dealings which occur, in 





The federal Proceeds of Crime Act provides for the confiscation of the proceeds of 
crime. The two forms of confiscation proceedings most relevant to dealing with illegally 
logged timber would be first, proceeding against assets following a conviction, and sec-
ond, against suspect assets without conviction.
94
 The first is a criminal procedure that 
produces forfeiture upon conviction of the predicate offence. This confiscation proce-
dure is not a criminal penalty and is therefore different to prosecution for the predicate 
offence itself under the Criminal Code. The second is a civil procedure, applicable when 
there has been no conviction for the predicate crime but when dealing in the proceeds of 




Part V of the AUSTRAC Act established the Australian Transaction Reports Analysis 
Centre (AUSTRAC) which is the Australian financial intelligence unit. It is the authori-
ty responsible for the performance of functions prescribed by the AML-CTF Act.
96
 
AUSTRAC oversees financial reporting requirements by collecting and analysing fi-
nancial transactions.
97
 A wide range of Australian institutions are covered by the AML-
CTF Act (including casinos, bullion and gem dealers, law practices, etc.),
98
 which re-
quires them to properly identify their customers
99
 and to report suspicious transactions 
to AUSTRAC.
100
 AUSTRAC provides its accumulated financial intelligence and infor-
mation to other authorities such as the Australian Taxation Office, the Australian Feder-
al Police and the Australian Crime Commission.
101
 It, like the PPATK, does not conduct 
prosecutions itself. 
 
FOLLOWING PROCEEDS FROM ILLEGAL INDONESIAN LOGGING IN 
AUSTRALIA: A TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME CASE 
STUDY 
 
An AML regime ‘follows the money’ or other proceeds of crime back to the illegal 
source. In relation to the proceeds of illegal logging, it starts by identifying a business 
profile with ‘suspicious wealth’ and then links the wealth back to the forestry sector and 
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to the illegal logging. It has been suggested that Indonesian financial service providers 
should suspect logging transactions to be high risk.
102
 The PPATK has sought to distin-





While the centralized Indonesian AML regime might avoid the obstacles posed by 
large-scale regional and local corruption within the fragmented forestry regulation sys-
tem, hopes for successful investigations are based on the premise that there continues to 
be no obstructing corruption in the centralized financial regulatory system.
104
 The integ-
rity of the current AML regime is supported by intense anti-corruption efforts.
105
 Yet, 
bribery remains pervasive among forestry officers, police and customs officials, politi-
cians, court officials and judges.
106
 The difficulties were exemplified in the acquittal of 
a rich and powerful ex-police commissioner on charges of money laundering and cor-
ruption
107
 and the release of a high-profile timber baron wanted for money launder-
ing.
108
 Therefore, the PPATK financial intelligence relating to transnational timber 





Australia imports AU$4.4 billion Australian of timber and wood products (excluding 
furniture) annually, of which it is estimated that up to AU$400 million come from ille-
gally harvested sources.
110
 Although the Commonwealth AML regime has been applied 
to trafficking in drugs and other contraband, it has not yet been applied to illegal log-
ging. 
 
The Australian capacity to identify, investigate, gather intelligence, prosecute and con-
fiscate the proceeds of crime in relation to transnational organized criminal activities is 
relatively strong.
111
 The agencies under the Attorney-General, including the Australian 
Criminal Intelligence Commission, the Australian Federal Police and AUSTRAC, as 
well as the Department of Agriculture, might combat illegal logging in Indonesia 
through the focused enforcement of Australian illegal timber and AML laws. AUS-
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TRAC, in cooperation with PPATK, could track dealings that originate with Indonesian 
illegal logging and end in Australian importation of the illegally harvested timber. It 
could also track the proceeds of sales which are made in Australia and that return as 
cash to Indonesia. AUSTRAC might also consider issuing guidelines for dealers in tim-
ber transactions, specifying high standards of due diligence in relation to the detection 
of illegal logging. 
 
ILLEGAL TIMBER SCENARIO 
 
The following section brings together the threads of discussion concerning Australian 
and Indonesian laws by presenting a case to test the potential use of prosecution and 
confiscation actions in Australia to combat dealings in products from illegal harvesting 
in Indonesia. In our hypothetical scenario, an Australian owned and operated company, 
called Hardware Wholesaler, imports timber flooring and fittings from Indonesia. The 
Australian company’s primary source is P.T. Graha Buana, a housing materials compa-
ny in Indonesia owned and operated by a family in Medan, Sumatra. The company har-
vests its own raw timber for processing and is known for its illegal logging practices in 
its operations in both Sumatra and West Papua. It holds licences to export timber prod-
ucts to Australia generated from both the Sumatran and Papuan logging operations. 
 
The Australian division of an environmental advocacy group, called Forest Defence, 
lobbies publicly against the marketing of P.T. Graha Buana wood products in Australia, 
collaborating with an Indonesian environment group to gather information concerning 
the illegal logging and its downstream products. They obtain DNA evidence that the 
shipment of flooring currently being sold by Hardware Wholesaler is from the species 
merbau, harvested in West Papua and for which P.T. Graha Buana does not hold a val-
id logging licence. The information is presented to the Australian Attorney-General to-
gether with a call for the prosecution of Hardware Wholesaler for dealing in the pro-
ceeds of crime, which are the merbau timber flooring and fittings imported from P.T. 
Graha Buana, including money from their sale, and the confiscation of those proceeds. 
 
AUSTRALIAN ILLEGAL LOGGING PROHIBITION ACT 
 
Under the Illegal Logging Prohibition Act 2012, an offence may be committed by im-
porting the timber from P.T. Graha Buana, without the need to prove that the actual 
timber in the shipment was illegally logged. It is sufficient to prove that it was imported 
in breach of the due diligence standard owed under Australian law by Hardware Whole-
saler. To prove due diligence compliance, the defendant would need to demonstrate ei-
ther that it made an independent risk assessment and took proportionate mitigation ac-
tion, or that its shipments conform to requirements of the Indonesian TLAS as demon-
strated by a V-Legal document, or that it conforms to an approved international legality 




In relation to a timber legality framework, Hardware Wholesaler would need a certifi-
cate issued to the harvester that provides evidence of its compliance with the legality 
framework. In relation to a country guideline, Hardware Wholesaler would need an In-
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donesian Timber Legality Certificate.
113
 If it has neither that nor an EU or other equiva-
lent international certificate, then, in light of lobbying by Forest Defence, the risk as-
sessment would have to take into account allegations and information against P.T. Gra-
ha Buana, including factors such as the species of timber, place of harvesting, legal 
rights to harvest and payment for harvesting rights, in order to determine whether it was 
illegally harvested. Hardware Wholesaler would then have to take proportionate mitiga-
tion action. If there is a likelihood of offending against the importation prohibition, the 
logical action would be not to import. 
 
Breaches of the Illegal Logging Prohibition Act 2012 can lead to both criminal and civil 
penalties. Criminal penalties of up to five years gaol apply for the intentional, knowing 
or reckless importation or processing of illegally logged timber or timber products.
114
 
Civil penalties in the form of fines (of up to AU$18,000) apply for breaches of any step 




MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE 
 
An Australian investigation concerning alleged money laundering and dealing in the 
proceeds by Hardware Wholesaler in Australia from illegally harvested timber import-
ed from Indonesia could also be pursued as a separate legal action. The acquisition by 
Australian investigators of information as to the location of logging sites, conditions of 
licences, confirmation of DNA data, evaluations of value, shipping operations of P.T. 
Graha Buana, etc., need the assistance of Indonesian police. To secure international as-
sistance in criminal investigations and prosecutions, national law enforcement authori-
ties must build mutual cooperation relationships with agencies in other countries. 
 
Australia and Indonesia have established a working relationship in law enforcement co-
operation only relatively recently. The 1995 Treaty between Australia and the Republic 
of Indonesia on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters entered into force in 1999.
116
 
There has not yet been any mutual assistance in matters of environmental crime. Con-
cerning money laundering, the mutual assistance treaty undertakings cover confiscation 
and forfeiture. Each country may request urgent ‘freezing’ action by the other to prevent 
any dealing in, transfer or disposal of suspected proceeds of crime, pending a final determi-
nation in respect of those proceeds by a court of the requesting country.
117
 A premise of 
mutual legal assistance is that the crimes of concern for cooperation be equivalent in 
each jurisdiction, having the quality of ‘dual criminality’. As the laws criminalizing 
money laundering and the procedures for the confiscation of the proceeds of crime are 
similar in each jurisdiction, mutual assistance in relation to them should not be prob-
lematic. For example, Indonesia has previously requested and been granted assistance in 
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relation to retrieving the proceeds of a major corruption case.
118
 Although legal coop-
eration has not yet been undertaken in the area of money laundering related to environ-
mental crimes, such as illegal logging, the framework is there to be utilized. 
 
DUAL CRIMINALITY IN PREDICATE OFFENCES 
 
Under Australian law, not all crimes qualify as predicate offences for AML prosecu-
tions. The Commonwealth Criminal Code identifies only indictable offences, or more 
serious offences, as predicate offences.
119
 As mentioned above, in cases where that orig-
inal predicate offence was not committed in Australia, an AML prosecution can still 
take place. It is not necessary under the Australian law to prove the actual commission 
by convicted persons of the particular instances of predicate offences. Instead, the pred-
icate offences would need merely to be demonstrated as having occurred. However, the 




The definition of a foreign indictable offence requires that there be dual criminality, i.e. 
that there be an equivalent to the foreign crime in Australia. The essential question then 
is whether illegal logging in Indonesia is conduct that would, had it occurred in Austral-
ia, be an indictable offence under Australian law? Unfortunately, forestry offences in 
Australia are not indictable. However, other real avenues exist to circumvent this short-
fall in dual criminality. 
 
First, as an alternative to the use of correlated forestry offences, the taking of logs might 
be characterized as a theft of government property. The ‘theft of land or things forming 
part of land’ belonging to the Commonwealth
121
 is an indictable offence under Australi-
an law.
122
 This has its correlate in Indonesian law, where illegal logging on Indonesian 
Government lands is treated as theft from the Indonesian Government.
123
 Major theft of 
government resources is treated in Indonesian law as corruption.
124
 Second, the link be-
tween corruption and illegal logging in Indonesia suggests bribery as a correlating pred-
icate offence under Australian law. Under the Commonwealth Criminal Code there is 
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dual criminality, as it is also an indictable offence to give bribes or ‘corrupting bene-
fits’
125
 to a Commonwealth public official.
126
 Third, as both Australian and Indonesia 
are obliged to outlaw participation in transnational organized crime groups,
127
 and as 
much of the illegal logging in Indonesia is transnational and organized, proscriptions on 
participation in transnational organized crime groups might offer yet another basis for 
establishing dual predicate offences in Australia and Indonesia. However, significant 
differences in the approach of each country to implementing the obligation to criminal-
ize participation in transnational organized crime negate their equivalence.
128
 Fourth, 
predicate crimes such as breaches of tax or import/export tariff laws might be applicable 
depending on the circumstances related to the illegal logging. 
 
Finally, in cases where imported timber itself is of an endangered species, the Com-
monwealth Environmental Protection Biodiversity Conservation Act proscribes the im-
portation of species listed in circumstances other than those allowed under the Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES).
129
 Un-
der CITES, international trade in some specified Indonesian timber species has been 
restricted
130
 and it is therefore an offence to import those timber species for commercial 
purposes or without an appropriate permit.
131
 This offence carries a penalty of up to 10 
years imprisonment or AU$110,000. The limitation in relying on predicate offences re-
lated to CITES is that they apply only to species listed as ‘endangered’. Ramin is listed 
on Appendix 3 of CITES, thereby prohibiting its commercial trade,
132
 but merbau, the 




There is a valid argument that practical obstacles to using AML techniques against for-
eign illegal logging render successful criminal prosecutions unlikely. The complexity of 
establishing dual criminality in predicate offences for timber crimes forms exemplifies 
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 Civil processes that form part of the AML toolkit may work more suc-
cessfully. 
 
CONFISCATION OF PROCEEDS 
 
Confiscation under the Commonwealth Proceeds of Crime Act allows for forfeiture of 
criminal assets based on conviction or for forfeiture based on a civil procedure. If based 
on a conviction, the original crime must have been an indictable offence or a ‘serious 
offence’.
135
 Following conviction, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 
can apply for forfeiture of the property comprising the proceeds.
136
 In the case of a seri-




To initiate a ‘civil forfeiture’,
138
 the Director of Public Prosecutions must demonstrate, 
on the balance of probability, that the money or property is the proceeds of an indictable 
offence that occurred within six years prior to the launch of confiscation proceedings. 
Once the presumption is raised, a defendant bears the burden of rebutting by proving 
that, on the balance of probability, the relevant property was not the proceeds of such an 
offence.
139
 Forfeited property vests in the government,
140
 but proceeds that are forfeited 
from transnational offences can be shared with a concerned foreign country.
141
 Civil 
forfeiture under the Proceeds of Crime Act for a foreign indictable offence related to 
illegal logging, such as theft, corruption, participation in a transnational organized crime 
group, or tax or tariff evasion, can therefore proceed without even a conviction in Indo-
nesia.
142
 For civil proceedings, the evidence need only prove, on the balance of proba-
bility, that the merbau flooring timber was produced from logs taken by such means in 
Indonesia less than six years before the Australian confiscation proceedings com-
menced. 
 
Under the Illegal Logging Prohibition Act 2012, forfeiture orders can be made by a 
court against any property in association with a criminal conviction, and civil forfeiture 
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of prohibited imports is also available without a court order.
143
 Therefore, failure to ex-
ercise due diligence in importing P.T. Graha Buana Indonesian timber products can re-
sult in confiscation and forfeiture of Hardware Wholesaler property. This is simpler 
than AML forfeiture because it operates locally and does not require a predicate foreign 





Indonesian law enforcement efforts against timber barons for illegal logging have been 
ineffective in local prosecutions. It is clear that much of the illegal logging is transna-
tional organized crime. Although no single solution is likely for this complicated prob-
lem, international cooperation could promote better law enforcement for Indonesian 
forests. Strategies such as building Indonesian capacity to manage forest resources and 
enforce existing regulations could be supplemented by responsible foreign controls on 
imported timber. Australia, the European Union and the United states have introduced 
due diligence requirements on importers to identify and certify timbers as sustainably 
and legally sourced. These are obligatory and supported by unilateral criminal prohibi-
tions that operate in the importation jurisdiction. It is important that these positive de-
velopments in import controls be introduced also in China – destination for half the 
world’s illegally logged timber, and in other major wood processing markets such as 
Vietnam. 
 
Timber legality regimes are not infallible, however, and even diligent importers may be 
duped by corrupt licensing, forgery and other fraudulent practices along the line of pro-
duction and delivery of timber. Thus, AML law enforcement remains a tool to comple-
ment timber legality frameworks. The transnational reach of AML laws affords an op-
portunity to tackle the principal beneficiaries of illegal logging. Nevertheless, the legal 
complexities of dual criminality in predicate offences and uncertainties of mutual legal 
assistance can frustrate AML criminal proceedings. Therefore, AML civil procedures 
for confiscating the presumed proceeds of crime, with a reduced burden of proof, are a 
simpler and more effective alternative to criminal processes. 
 
The legal tools to combat illegal logging discussed in this Indonesia-Australia case 
study could be applied across other forms of transnational environmental crime. An era 
of improved international coordination of national AML laws and of international coop-
eration in law enforcement to combat a broader range of transnational environmental 
crimes is possible. 
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